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Abstract
Existing peer effects studies produce contradictory findings, including positive, nega-
tive, large, and small effects, despite similar contexts. We reconcile these results using
U.S. Naval Academy data covering a 22-year history of the random assignment of
students to peer groups. Coupled with students’ limited discretion over freshman-year
courses, our setting affords an opportunity to better understand peer effects in different
social networks. We find negative effects at the broader “company” level—students’
social and residential group—and positive effects at the narrower course-company level.
We suggest that peer spillovers change direction because of differences in the underly-
ing mechanism of peer influence.
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1 Introduction
Economists have closely studied the role of peer effects at all levels of schooling but, so far,
have had difficulty extending these insights into the policy arena. Research has demonstrated
the prevalence of peer effects in higher education in particular. Studies of institutional data
from Dartmouth College, Williams College, the University of Maryland, Berea College,
the United States Military Academy (USMA), and the United States Air Force Academy
(USAFA) have revealed peer effects of various sizes on a range of academic outcomes.1 Some
of most notable effects have been observed at USAFA where Carrell et al. (2009) estimate
that a 100-point increase in the peer-group average SAT verbal score increases freshman
students’ GPAs, on average, by 0.4 grade points on a 4.0 scale.2 In a follow-up study, Carrell
et al. (2013) analyze a direct intervention in which the researchers themselves allocate
incoming students into peer groups designed to positively influence academic marks, as
predicted by their historical estimates of peer effects. The intervention, however, backfires;
the targeted beneficiaries of the experiment experience statistically significant reductions
in their grades. The implications of these findings are profound, suggesting that policy
makers who seek to affect the composition of students, with the intent to improve student
performance, are as of yet still peering into a black box.
In this paper, we attempt to unpack the complex process of peer group formation to
better understand why researchers have measured so many disparate peer effects, positive
and negative, large and small. To do so, we offer both an empirical examination and a
conceptual model of peer interaction. For the former, we examine data on college freshmen
at the United States Naval Academy (USNA), using a dataset that includes more than
100,000 fall semester grades from over 20,000 freshmen. In employing college level data, we
follow in the tradition of studies cited above. Unlike previous studies on college students,
however, the size of our dataset, which includes over twenty graduating classes spanning 1991
to 2012, is the largest examined thus far at the college level.3 In employing service academy
data, we also follow in the tradition of Lyle (2007) and Carrell et al. (2009), both of which
exploit the random assignment of students into residential groups (called “companies”) to
identify peer effects. Unlike these studies, however, we explore how interaction depends on
the size and purpose of the group, which may then lead to either positive or negative peer
effects in different situations.
1See Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Foster (2006), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006), Lyle
(2007), and Carrell et al. (2009).
2The researchers suggest that their estimates are larger than previous findings because of the size (ap-
proximately 30 students) and critical role of peer groups at USAFA compared to more narrow roommate
linkages seen in other studies. But they also find peer group SAT math scores to be statistically insignificant
to individual achievement.
3Notable datasets on primary and secondary students include those analyzed by Burke and Sass (2013)
and Lavy et al. (2012). Also, Cornelissen et al. (2013) analyze a very large dataset of German retirees.
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We provide theoretical motivation with a simple model of peer interaction where
a student is motivated both by homophily , which pulls her towards individuals of simi-
lar attributes, and by academic spillovers from peers, which may pull her towards a dif-
ferent group of individuals. The model illustrates why—in situations with broad social
interaction—individuals move towards more similar peers, while situations requiring “nar-
row” task-based interactions can induce individuals to collaborate with peers who have
different attributes. These interactions in turn affect individual performance. The insights
of our model are evocative of explanations found in a variety of peer group studies, including
the ideas of “invidious comparison” and the explanation of academic outcomes captured by
the “boutique” model of peer interaction (see Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) for discussion;
we expound on these ideas in section 5.4).4
We produce two primary empirical findings. First, we find negative peer effects at
the full company level (which defines a students’ residential and social group). For STEM
courses (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), average peer ability across all
freshman companymates, as measured by both verbal and math SAT scores, negatively
affects own grades. The negative peer effect measured for both SAT categories is a rare
result in the peer effects literature; it stands in contrast, for example, to a positive effect
found for verbal SAT scores by both Zimmerman (2003) and Carrell et al. (2009). Yet our
negative peer effects at the company level are consistent with the findings from Carrell et al.
(2013)’s hands-on experiment at USAFA. Moreover, the negative effects are consistent with
the notion of homophily captured in our conceptual model. Our negative result comes from
models with both linear and non-linear specifications, and is robust to numerous sensitivity
checks. Second, we find that at the company-course level—students in the same company
and the same course—average peer ability positively affects student performance, but only
for relatively small companymate-coursemate peer groups. This latter result is consistent
with most of the papers cited thus far. Our contrasting results conform with the idea
that students may avoid interaction in broader social settings, yet may benefit from closer
interactions in smaller groups that perform specific common tasks.
The unique setting at USNA allows us to better understand the black box of peer
interaction by exploiting differences in peer group interaction at both a broad group level
(the company), and subgroup levels (specific course-company peer subgroups). Within
various peer subgroups, the scope of student interaction can differ and potential spillovers
can vary in intensity across peers (see Manresa (2013) for discussion of such a possibility).
Companies at USNA are well suited for studying such peer effects, both because dorm
selection is randomly assigned and because students spend an inordinate amount of time
4Our model might also be considered an alternative to the utility maximization problem found in Cicala
et al. (2014) where peer effects arise solely from comparative advantage. Our model however embodies the
idea that peer effects arise partly due to a spillover from interaction (since utility maximization is a function
of peer ability), whereas in Cicala et al. (2014) the actual behavior of peers has no effect on an agent’s
utility.
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with their companymates in many aspects of college life. While previous studies have looked
at peer effects on college students at the dorm-room level, dorm-floor level, and at the service
academy residential group level, ours is the first to examine peer effects within residential
groups and at the course level. In such settings, there is a natural opportunity for students
to collaborate on similar tasks with their neighbors. Importantly, students at USNA have
no discretion either over the assignment of their companies or their course enrollment during
their first semester of freshman year. Hence, we exploit the variation in pre-treatment peer
ability at the company level (i.e., the average SAT score across all freshman companymates),
as well as the variation in pre-treatment peer ability at the company-course level to analyze
how spillovers may differ across various observable subgroups of students. In other words,
unique to other peer effects studies we measure peer effects within more narrowly defined
subgroups that are clearly designated to engage in common tasks, as opposed to interacting
in a broader social group while taking disparate courses.
Our paper helps reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings in the literature,
where each study observes a different social network and thus uncovers a different type of
social interaction. Our emphasis on subgroup formation within broader peer groups stresses
the need to understand the context of social settings and how common tasks can magnify
endogenous peer effects. Failure to take these factors into consideration when attempting
to manipulate peer groups can otherwise produce disastrous outcomes. Our broader picture
of peer interaction has potential implications for policy changes, and we expound on these
themes in the remaining sections of the paper. Section 2 provides a brief review of the key
insights from the literature of most interest to our paper, and it also offers a theoretical
motivation for our empirical findings. In Section 3 we explain our setting and dataset in
more detail. The final sections summarize the estimation strategy and results, and provide
discussion.
2 Motivation and Conceptual Framework
2.1 Identifying Peer Effects
The measurement of peer effects is complicated by “reflection.” Peer effects are the reflection
of our own image as it is cast upon our friends, who in turn cast their image back upon us.5
This reflection is a function of our respective backgrounds, our current interactions with each
other, and the environment in which we interact. Manski (1993) categorizes each of these
factors in turn as contextual effects, endogenous effects, and correlated effects. Endogenous
effects are a function of simultaneity, where peer group members affect each other and the
5Manski (1993) deliberately uses the term “reflection” to evoke one looking in a mirror. An alien observer
would not be able to tell if the image in the mirror was initiating movement, or if the person in front of the
mirror was doing so.
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observer cannot tell who is really affecting whom (see Glaser (2009) for succinct discussion).6
Contextual effects stem from the predetermined attributes (innate ability or training) of the
peer group. The term “contextual” comes from the sociology literature whereas economists
would perhaps call it “exogenous.”
Correlated effects refer to either common factors affecting a peer group or to the
tendency of people to consort with those who they perceive as like-minded individuals. Com-
mon factors could include the quality of the teacher in a particular class, the air conditioner
not working for an entire semester, and so on. The desire to associate with similar people
is a selection problem. An individual may gravitate towards those with characteristics they
fancy in themselves and hence in others (early risers, tidy, a love of classical music, and so
on). This makes it difficult to identify a peer effect since the features of an individual may
be correlated with why he or she is a part of that group to begin with (Lyle, 2007).
Consider the following structural form of the reflection issue where the researcher
specifies the effect of peers on student i as follows:
GPAict = β0 + β1GPAjct + β2PREjc,t−1 + β3PREic,t−1 + uict (1)
GPA is the usual academic measure for grade point average, PRE is a measure of the
exogenous “pre-treatment” ability the students bring with them to college (this is the “con-
textual” effect in Manski’s parlance). The subscript indicates person i in peer group c in
time period t. Subscript j denotes peer group members, where j 6= i. GPA and PRE are
the averages of those peer group members’ GPAs and pretreatment characteristics, respec-
tively. The specification can be amended to control for various fixed effects (we discuss this
more later with respect to our estimation). The parameter β1 measures the endogenous
peer effect while β2 captures the contextual peer effect.
The inability to identify peer effects comes in three related forms. First, the un-
observed selection process implies the error term will be correlated with the group pre-
treatment variable. Second, group performance at time t will be correlated with the error
term via the endogenous effect (the simultaneity of peer influence). And third, measurement
of β2 may be further biased by common factors affecting all members of the group. Hence,
in the structural equation both peer effect parameters β1 and β2 are likely to be biased.
The literature approaches the bias in different ways. A recent cadre of papers
deals with the selection issue using “natural experiments” where peer groups are randomly
assigned. Given the random assignment, the selection issue is mitigated. Relatively recent
examples include Sacerdote (2001) and Lyle (2007); both estimate the structural equation
(or some close version of it) shown in equation (1). Sacerdote (2001) estimates peer effects
6There tends to be some confusion in the literature with respect to Manski’s terms. “Reflection” is
sometimes listed as a fourth category. However, based on our reading of Manski (1993) and papers such
as Glaser (2009) and Durlaf and Ioannides (2010), we believe our description to be consistent with Manski
(1993).
5
with random dorm room assignments of freshmen at Dartmouth. He regresses a freshman’s
GPA on own level of ability (a “pre-treatment” metric that includes SAT scores and high
school class rank), on roommate’s pre-treatment ability, and on roommate’s GPA. In this
case Sacerdote (2001) obtains an unbiased estimate of roommate’s contextual background
but not roommate’s GPA. The key to identification for the former effect is the random
assignment which limits any possible correlation between roommate pre-treatment ability
and other factors that may influence freshman i’s GPA—parental pressure, non-roommate
peers, and other components of the error term. As long as those factors are uncorrelated
with roommates’ background then one has a “clean” estimate of the peer effect from the
roommate’s pre-treatment ability.
Sacerdote (2001) ultimately finds that roommate pre-treatment ability is not a
statistically significant explanatory factor for freshman GPA—so there is no contextual peer
effect. However, roommate GPA is a statistically significant predictor of freshman GPA, but
the result is obviously plagued by simultaneity bias. Sacerdote however suggests that bias
notwithstanding, the statistically significant coefficient provides evidence of a positive peer
effect. That is, Sacerdote claims, the biased coefficient represents some peer effect, even if
the measurement is aﬄicted by simultaneity.
Lyle (2007) finds similar results to Sacerdote (2001) using random assignment of
freshmen to companies at USMA to control for selection in the estimation of the structural
equation above. Rather than being assigned to dorms or dorm floors, freshmen at the
USMA are sorted into companies, which are peer groups built from all class years (freshman,
sophomore, junior, and senior). Lyle (2007) finds the endogenous peer effect is statistically
significant, but the contextual effect is statistically insignificant. In his application, however,
Lyle (2007) emphasizes that common shocks may explain much of the endogenous effect.7
Given the inherent bias in measuring the endogenous effect, both Sacerdote (2001)
and Lyle (2007) also estimate reduced form versions of the structural equation shown above.
The reduced form can be written,
GPAict =
(
β0
1− β1
)
+ β3PREic,t−1 +
(
β2 + β1β3
1− β1
)
PREjc,t−1 + εict (2)
where the parameters map to the structural equation shown in equation (1).8 Lyle (2007)
does not find a statistically significant “reduced form peer effect” (i.e., he cannot reject
that the coefficient on PRE is zero). Sacerdote (2001), however, finds some evidence in one
version of the reduced form model, where having high ability roommates suggests a positive
peer effect.
7Previously, Sacerdote (2001) had recognized the possibility of common shocks. He imposed dorm-level
fixed effects, which made little difference in his results.
8See Manski (1993) for more details on the mapping between the structural model and the reduced form
in this literature.
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More recent studies—such as Guryan et al. (2009), Zimmerman (2003), Stinebrick-
ner and Stinebrickner (2006), Foster (2006), and Carrell et al. (2009)—eschew the structural
form altogether and focus solely on the reduced form. The latter use random assignment
of freshmen into “squadrons” at USAFA to search for peer effects in the reduced form set-
ting. Their measure of peer pre-treatment—verbal SAT scores—is statistically significant
and positive at the squadron level, yet weak at the roommate level. Peers’ average verbal
SAT score is statistically significant predictor of academic performance for math and sci-
ence courses, but strangely not for language courses. Also counter-intuitively, peers’ average
math SAT score is not statistically significant for math and science courses.
The result in Carrell et al. (2009) is consistent with numerous findings that the
composition of peer groups is important but also produces some unintuitive results. Zim-
merman (2003) cites research on primary school students, whose performance increases with
average classroom IQ, but at a diminishing rate. Zimmerman (2003) suggests that mixing
students of varying ability (rather than segregating students) should generate higher ag-
gregate learning. Indeed, Carrell et al. (2009) find that low ability students benefit from
proximity to high ability peers (more than average ability students do).
2.2 Negative Peer Effects and Homophily
With group composition in mind, Carrell et al. (2013) implement an “optimal” peer assign-
ment experiment at USAFA to harness the positive spillovers found in Carrell et al. (2009).
The peer group assignments were meant to improve the performance of the lowest ability
students, where the primary treatment group (“bimodal squadrons”) includes low ability
students alongside a larger fraction of peers with high SAT verbal scores. A second treatment
group (“homogeneous squadrons”) is comprised of primarily “middle ability” students.
Contrary to most evidence from the empirical literature, Carrell et al. (2013) esti-
mate a negative treatment effect for the main treatment group of interest—the low ability
students perform worse than similar students in the control group. Conversely, students
in the homogenous treatment group perform better than their counterparts in the control
group.
The authors suggest that homophily effects explain the results. The low-ability
students in the treatment group were more likely to study with—and identify as friends—
other low-ability students in their squadron (friends were identified via a follow up survey
conducted by the authors). The higher ability students in the treatment squadron segregate
themselves similarly. The middle ability students, on the other hand, appear to benefit from
the homogeneity of their group. In the control group, the tendency for such sorting was
less apparent. Another example of a negative estimate is from Foster (2006). For a sample
of University of Maryland students, she estimates a statistically significant negative peer
effect on male students that stems from their peers’ median SAT scores (but not from peers’
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average SAT scores). Using data on Florida’s public school system, Burke and Sass (2013)
find that peer effects are negative for low ability students if they are grouped with students
at the high end of the distribution.
It thus appears that even with random assignment, the literature has yet to reach a
consensus on peer effects. Likely, different social networks which form in different contexts
complicate inference (Jackson, 2008). Unfortunately, the nature of this sort of endogenous
group formation is a “black box,” as Carrell et al. (2013) note towards the end of their paper.
We can, however, conjecture and empirically examine how the push/pull of homophily might
lead to different outcomes in different settings.
2.3 A Simple Framework
To make more concrete some of the ideas mentioned above, let us consider a student who
cares about only two things, her grades, defined as G, and her “homophily index,” defined as
H. Assume each of these depend on the student’s own innate characteristics, and potentially
the characteristics of her peers. Let us further assume that if the student interacts with the
peer group, the student’s homophily index erodes away as her characteristics become more
different from the group’s. On the other hand, with social interaction, the student’s grades
will tend to converge to the average of the group. That is, if the student is relatively weak,
her grades will improve with more interaction. If the student is relatively strong, her grades
will deteriorate with more interaction.
More specifically, assume that the student aims to maximize U , where
U = GαH1−α (3)
and 0 < α < 1. Given a certain group of other students, the student chooses with whom to
interact. That is, the student chooses both the number and type of people to form her peer
group in order to maximize equation (3). Let us consider ability as the sole characteristic
that matters, and that ability is innate. a0 is the student’s ability, while ai is peer i’s ability.
Let us then have following functional forms:
G =
(
a0 + γ
N∑
i=1
(ai − a0)
)ψ
(4)
H = a0 +N − φ
N∑
i=1
|ai − a0| (5)
where N is the number of the student’s chosen peers (which conceivably could be zero),
γ > 0 measures the degree of ability spillover to the student’s grade performance, φ > 0
measures the degree of distaste for ability differences, and 0 < ψ < 1. The meaning of each
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measure is straight-forward. Equation (4) suggests that interacting with peers of stronger
ability helps the student achieve better grades, although at a diminishing rate. Interacting
with weaker ability students on the other hand deteriorates the student’s performance. If
the student chooses not to interact at all, then she relies solely on her own ability a0. On
the other hand, equation (5) suggests that while the student is a “social” creature and so
derives utility from having more peers in general (hence the inclusion of N),9 interacting
with peers of relative stronger or weaker ability erodes one’s homophily index, thus lowering
overall utility. The student’s decision on the number and type of other students to interact
with is essentially based on which effect dominates.10
2.4 Numerical Examples
Let us demonstrate the simple framework above with some numbers. First consider a student
with low relative ability a0 = 1. She has three potential peers, each who range in ability
from 2 ≥ ai ≥ 2.5. Assume that α = ψ = 0.5, and that γ = φ = 1. For a given potential
group with given characteristics, the student has eight possible choices to maximize equation
(3): befriend no one (and receive a grade of aψ0 ), befriend one of four students, befriend two
students (for which there are three possibilities), or befriend all three.
The top portion of figure 1 demonstrates the effects on the student’s grade as the
average ability of the peer group increases (we increase ability uniformly across all three of
the other students). For the low-ability peer group her grade is highest—she befriends all
three because her homophily index is fairly large, and her grade is better because her peers
still have higher ability than she does. However, as average peer quality improves, she starts
cutting people out of her life because her homophily index starts falling. As her peer group
shrinks from three to two to one, her grade suffers, and each drop is larger than the next.
Finally with a large enough average group quality, she is left alone to earn a grade of one.
Now consider a relatively high-ability student. In this case suppose the number and
average peer group quality is the same, but now the student has an ability of a0 = 2.5. The
bottom portion of figure 1 demonstrates the effects on this student’s grade as the average
ability of the peer group increases across the same range as before. For the low range of peer
ability, the high-ability student chooses to be isolated from the others and earns a grade of
aψ0 . As the average quality of the peer group improves, the high-ability student befriends
more and more individuals. But because each new peer is still of lower quality than the
9Qualitative results are not sensitive to the inclusion of N in the homophily index.
10Alternate approaches to modeling peer effects are of course possible, perhaps most notably in Cicala et
al. (2014). In their model individuals sort into peer groups based on comparative advantage. We believe
our approach is more appropriate for this study, for two reasons. One, Cicala et al. (2014) do not model
peer spillovers. While an appropriate omission in certain contexts, we believe academic spillovers to be a
potentially important effect of peer interaction. Two, our empirical evidence suggests that one’s ordinal
rank within one’s company matters far less for one’s academic performance than the average ability of the
peer group.
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student, her grades suffer with each new friend. With quality high enough, she befriends
the whole group; after that point any further quality improvements for the group raises her
performance.
We thus see that there can exist a range of peer ability such that increases in average
peer ability can hurt individual performance for both high-ability and low-ability students.
For low-ability students, negative peer effects can be seen as arising from an “invidious
comparison” effect suggested by Hoxby and Weingarth (2005). For high-ability students,
negative peer effects can be viewed as a somewhat novel take on the “bad apple” model,
again mentioned in Hoxby and Weingarth (2005). Ironically, we show here that bad apples
can pull down performance, even as these apples become less bad.
We can also observe that these effects will be sensitive to the degree to which
homophily preferences matter. To see this we redo the above exercises, but here we lower
the degree of distaste for ability differences, φ, to 0.1. Conceivably this may arise with a
change in the nature of personal interactions. Results for both low and high-ability students
are displayed in figure 2. Here the low-ability student remains friends with all three peers,
since grade spillover benefits now outweigh negative homophily effects from peer quality
improvements. As such her performance monotonically rises with group quality. On the
other hand, the high-ability student moves from one to two to three friends, and her grade
performance shows ups and downs with no overall trend.
Thus we see that when dis-utility from group heterogeneity is limited, higher average
peer quality can raise own performance. This would be consistent with the “shining light”
model of peer effects (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005).
This simple framework demonstrates that endogenous peer group formation matters
even when “formal” groups of potential peers are exogenously created. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the model provides us with a cautionary tale: positive peer effects can be harnessed,
but only in situations where the dis-utility from low homophily is not too great. In order
to implicitly test this framework, we require different social settings of interactions where φ
would conceivably vary. Can we find instances where students, thrust together in common
purpose, embrace their differences instead of shielding themselves from them? Data derived
from features of USNA, described below, provide us such a setting. The following sections
test some of the implications presented above with evidence from freshman students enrolled
at USNA.
3 Our Setting
3.1 Data
Our data, which were compiled with the aid of USNA’s Office of Institutional Research,
contain far more observations—more than 100,000 grades from over 20,000 first-semester
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freshmen-–than comparable studies from other college-level institutions.11 In addition to
every grade assigned to freshmen in the classes of 1991-2012, we observe the following
student-specific characteristics: race/ethnicity, whether a recruited athlete, whether previ-
ously enlisted in the armed forces, whether attended a one-year preparatory school prior
to enrolling at USNA,12 and math and verbal SAT scores. Table 1 contains summary aca-
demic and demographic statistics for freshman students. While a relatively white and male
student body, a fair representation of minority and female students exists, especially during
the latter years of our sample.
3.2 Company Random Assignment
USNA provides an ideal setting to identify the effects of social interactions on academic
achievement. Upon arrival, every freshman is assigned into a company. All students live in
one on-campus dormitory, which houses 30 companies of approximately 150 students, each
containing an even mix of freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors. A student’s company
makes up his or her basic group of potential peers. The company assignment procedure,
which is administered by the Admissions Office, is designed to produce a demographically
diverse but otherwise randomly allocated mix of students in each company. Students are
first stratified according to certain predetermined characteristics: race, gender, home state,
prior military service, and attendance at a one-year Naval Academy preparatory school.
Once administrators ensure balanced representation among these characteristics across all
companies, they randomly assign all remaining students to companies.13 The key features
of the procedure are that students have no control over the outcome—USNA does not solicit
interests, lifestyle details, or roommate preferences as is typical at other universities—and
it produces an allocation that is effectively random. The mechanism prevents students from
sorting into residence hall groupings that could offer academic or personal advantages.
If companies are randomly assigned, then we should not be able to predict own
SAT scores from freshman companymates’ average SAT scores, conditional on the strata
mentioned above (gender, race/ethnicity, etc.). We estimate two OLS regressions for each
subsample of freshmen from every graduating class 1991-2012: conditional on the predeter-
mined characteristics that affect company assignment, we regress (1) own SAT math score
on freshman companymates’ average SAT math score, and (2) own SAT verbal score on
freshman companymates’ average SAT verbal score. Table 2 presents the results. Two out
of the 44 regressions show problematic correlations (at α = .05), a proportion that is in line
with a five percent chance of Type I error. Our findings confirm that the assignment of
11For comparison, Carrell et al . (2009) utilize a sample of approximately 20,000 grades.
12See Kotlikoff et al. (2015) on the effects of these specific programs on educational outcomes.
13This procedure is very similar to USAFA’s, described by Carrell et al. (2009). It differs from the
procedure at USMA, described by Lyle (2007), which additionally produces an even mix of academic ability
(proxied by incoming SAT score) across companies. Lower variation in academic achievement at USMA
across companies yield an environment in which it is much more difficult to estimate peer effects.
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freshmen to companies is random.
3.3 Course Random Assignment
In addition to the random assignment of peer groups, there are other features that make
USNA an ideal laboratory in which to examine peer effects. All freshmen must pass or
validate a set of 11 core courses in a range of subject areas such as calculus, chemistry,
political science, and naval history. With little variation, these courses form their entire
first year schedule.14 Importantly for our study, freshmen at USNA cannot select whom
they take a course with (either instructor or peers) during the fall semester. As part of
the students’ “Plebe Summer”—the summer-long indoctrination of the freshman class—fall
semester courses and sections are selected for students.15 Indeed, students only learn of
their schedules in mid-August, just prior to the beginning of the semester.
The course schedules are determined unilaterally by the Registrar’s office. Once
results from validation or placement exams administered during the summer are considered,
the registrar generates freshman schedules for the fall semester.16 As part of that process,
some course selection is simply a function of whichever company to which a student is
assigned. For example, in the fall semester all freshmen in 1st through 15th Companies
will take American Government, and the rest will take American Naval History. Hence,
attempting to select a course to be with one’s friends, or for a particular instructor that
an upperclassman recommends, is simply not possible at USNA.17 Later, in Section 5.3, we
provide some statistical support for the randomness of course assignment.
Lastly with respect to our dataset, USNA has relatively low grade inflation. Based
on our sample, average GPAs have risen over the years, from an average of 2.7 in 1991 to
3.0 in 2009. Rojstaczer and Healy (2010) show that average GPAs from a large sample of
American four-year colleges have increased approximately linearly from 2.9 in 1991 to 3.1
in 2006. Thus the trend at USNA is steeper but averages remain lower, compared to other
schools. Given that GPAs are far more frequently bounded from above than below, this
suggests both that there is higher grade variation at USNA and that grades produce higher
signal-to-noise ratios than at other institutions.
14In fact, freshmen are restricted to only 11 courses in the first year. Only with direct approval from the
Academic Dean can a freshman take a twelfth course (and a student at most can take six courses during
the fall semester).
15“Plebe Summer” begins in late June and runs up to the beginning of the fall semester in late August.
It is USNA’s version of boot camp for the incoming freshman class. Freshmen are commonly referred to as
“Plebes” at USNA.
16The validation or placement exams are the only form of indirect student input in the process. For
example a subset of students will validate Calculus I via AP scores or a placement exam and instead start
with Calculus II during the fall semester. Nevertheless, regardless at whichever level the student places,
they cannot choose the particular section of the course.
17The information described in this section is from USNA’s “Plebe Academic Handbook,” provided to
freshmen during Plebe Summer, and USNA’s “Plebe Advising Handbook,” which is provided to faculty
members serving as academic advisers to the students during their freshman year.
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4 Econometric Model
4.1 Baseline Model
We envision a freshman’s first semester academic grades following a “production process”
with inputs: (1) own high school (i.e., pre-USNA) characteristics; (2) peers’ high school
characteristics; and (3) variation that is specific to course and academic year. Given the
similarities between USNA and USAFA, we adopt a specification similar to that of Carrell
et al. (2009). We use the following linear model:
Gigct = α+ βZigt + γ
∑
k 6=i Zkgt
ngt − 1 + δXigt + θYct + ηt + εigct. (6)
In this specification, Gigct is grade (on a standard four point scale) of student i in peer
group g (i.e., company g) for course c in academic year t.18 We only use grades from the
fall semester of freshman year to avoid issues related to potential self-selection into courses in
subsequent semesters. Zigt includes student i’s pre-USNA characteristics that may directly
affect academic achievement, for which we proxy with SAT math and SAT verbal scores.
Zkgt represents SAT math and verbal scores for student k, who is one of i’s companymates
within company g. γ captures the influence of i’s “average” companymate, as we average
over these two characteristics for all k 6= i. Xigt is the set of pre-USNA controls for student
i: race/ethnicity, gender, whether a recruited athlete, whether attended a feeder school,
and whether he or she possessed prior military experience. Yct includes information that
is specific to course-years (which can be accounted for via a fixed effect) and ηt is a set
of academic year dummies. εigct represents all omitted factors. By construction, εigct is
uncorrelated with Zkgt because peer assignment is random and all peer characteristics in
Zkgt were established before arriving at USNA (i.e., prior to treatment).
4.2 Incorporating Coursemate Subgroups into the Model
For the model in equation (6), there remains an interpretation issue that, if not properly
understood, can lead to unanticipated effects from policy interventions as seen in Carrell
et al. (2013). We cannot distinguish what is driving the value of γ. Recall from Section
2 the reduced form parameter is an amalgam of the structural parameters that identify
the endogenous effect β1, the contextual effect β2, and the own-pre-treatment effect β3 (see
equation (2)). That is, the reduced form peer effect that we can estimate is:
γ =
(
β2 + β1β3
1− β1
)
. (7)
18Academic year t does not represent the time period in the usual context of panel data, because we use
each student’s grades only from his or her initial semester. In other words, there is only one time period t for
each student i, but we include the subscript to indicate possible academic year effects (e.g., grade inflation).
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Our conceptual framework in Section 2 indicates that negative peer effects may arise when
students choose to group themselves by ability within a broader group, and this effect
becomes more pronounced as the preference for homophily rises. In that setting, it is
not clear if the negative peer effect arises due to the simultaneous peer interaction (the
endogenous effect) or from the contextual effects.
An important distinction in understanding the possible mechanism driving positive
or negative peer effects is the social multiplier discussed by Manski (1993), Glaeser et al.
(2003), and Durlaf and Ioannides (2010) where positive peer influence occurs simultaneously.
Also, Sacerdote (2001) notes, “positive student behavior leads to more positive behavior.”
Glaser (2009) explains that there is no feedback with respect to contextual features since the
factors are predetermined. Instead, any contextual peer effects must occur due to variation
in the levels of pretreatment ability among the group. Is there a circumstance where the
social multiplier—the endogenous effect β1 in equation (1)—might have a negative sign?
Consider the endogenous effect captured by β1. For β1 to be negative it must be
that the high performance of the peer group somehow leads to individual students’ per-
formance, on average, being diminished by interacting in time t with the high-performers
(controlling for the contextual differences). At first glance, one might imagine a scenario
where a member of the group is hazed by other members of the group, so much so their
performance suffers. Or more benignly, perhaps there exists a “rebel” scenario where one
rebel’s performance declines as high-performers’ behavior defines the group. We think it is
reasonable to suggest that such scenarios are unlikely to dominate, on average. Instead, it
seems likely that any idiosyncratic negative effects would be dominated by other, positive
contemporaneous effects. It is also reasonable to assume that β1< 1, since peers’ contempo-
raneous achievement should not have a multiplied impact on own achievement. Therefore,
we assume:
Assumption 1. 0 ≤ β1 < 1
Second, consider the coefficient on own ability, β3. It is very reasonable to assume
that a student’s own predetermined ability is positively correlated with his or her grades:
Assumption 2. β3 > 0
In equation (7), under Assumptions 1 and 2, a negative “total peer effect” γ can
only arise from a negative contextual effect β2. On the other hand, a positive estimate of γ
could be produced by either a positive β2, or a negative β2 that is drowned out by relatively
strong β1 and β3 parameters.
The key insight here is that our conceptual model (Section 2) and the discussion of
structural estimation (above) are compatible. Both suggest that any negative estimate of γ
must stem from a negative contextual effect, such as sorting on predetermined characteris-
tics. On the other hand, any positive estimate of γ could stem from a positive contextual
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and/or a positive endogenous effect. This observation has important policy implications,
which we discuss in Section 5.4.
Given the natural experiment at USNA, we can consistently estimate γ but cannot
identify its three components separately. However, we harness USNA’s joint random as-
signment into companies and course sections, which allows us to test whether higher-quality
peers may either positively or negatively influence academic achievement, depending on
peer group setting. Or in other words, we can test that the contextual effect can differ in
sign, as the conceptual model of Section 2 suggests. In particular, we focus on one possi-
ble channel through which peer effects may operate: collaboration between students in the
same company and the same course. That is, the peer effect now stems from companymate-
coursemates, rather than just companymates. We modify equation (6) as follows:
Gigct,s = αs + βsZigt,s + γs
∑
k 6=i Zkgct,s
ngct,s − 1 + δsXigt,s + θsYct,s + ηt,s + εigct,s (8)
We estimate equation (8) on subsamples of the data that are stratified by the sizes of
companymate-coursemate peer groups. To reflect that the size and direction of peer ef-
fects may differ depending on the composition of one’s peer group, equation (8) introduces
a subscript for peer group sizes, s.19 Smaller companymate-coursemate groups suggest a
special more narrow relationship affecting performance. As the companymate-coursemate
group size increases, this relationship dilutes. In the most extreme case, the companymate-
coursemate group is the same as the companymate group (i.e., everyone in the company
takes the same course). Here, we are simply back to estimating companymate effects,
as in equation (6). Figure 3 shows the distributions of these peer groups’ sizes for hu-
manities/social science and math/science courses, separately. Given the distributions, it is
reasonable to use peer group stratifications of sizes 2-10, 11-30, and over 30, for s.
Based on the conceptual model in Section 2, our prior is that γ from equation (6)
is less than γs from equation (8) for more narrowly-defined peer groups s. By isolating
smaller peer groups whose students are engaged in course-specific tasks, peer ability would
conceivably matter more for positive grade performance due to greater peer interaction. In
the conceptual framework, this would be consistent with a lower distaste for peer differences,
φ; students of disparate backgrounds would be more likely to engage in narrow and focused
interactions and thereby benefit from higher-ability peers.
19Also note that the peer effect variable
∑
k 6=i Zkgct,s
ngct,s−1 now includes subscripts for shared course c.
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5 Results
5.1 Baseline Model
Table 3 contains OLS estimates of equation (6). We cluster standard errors by academic
year-company groups and estimate separate regressions for math or science (henceforth
math/sci) course grades, and humanities or social science (henceforth hum/ss) course grades.
Each provides us roughly 50,000 grade observations.
Estimates of all control variables have reasonable signs and magnitudes consistent
with prior research on academic performance. Women perform better than men in hu-
manities and social sciences, but worse in math and science courses. Minorities, recruited
athletes, and preparatory school attendees tend to under-perform in the classroom, likely
due to selection. Freshmen who were previously enlisted in the armed forces earn math and
science grades that are higher, on average, by 0.16 grade points.
Turning to our measures of background academic ability, we unsurprisingly find
that own verbal and math SAT scores have strong statistically significant effects on perfor-
mance for both course types. Specifically, 100 additional points in one’s verbal SAT score is
associated with an increase in one’s own grade in a hum/ss class by a third of a letter grade
(e.g., from a B to a B+), with smaller results for math SAT scores. On the other hand,
a 100 point increase in one’s math SAT score corresponds to a higher grade in a math/sci
course by half a letter grade, with smaller results for verbal SAT scores.
Results become more startling when we look at the average SAT scores for one’s
peer group, as measured by fellow freshman in the same company. Estimated coefficients on
these measures are all negative. Effects from average peer verbal SAT scores are negative
and statistically significant for both hum/ss and math/sci courses. Effects from average
peer math SAT scores are negative and statistically significant for only math/sci courses.
For example, a 100 point increase in average peer math SAT scores produces a fifth of a
letter grade lower own performance in math/sci courses.
Columns 2 and 5 include the standard deviation of peer’s verbal and math SAT
scores. Lyle (2007) suggests that peer heterogeneity may affect individual performance.
Here we see that estimated coefficients on peer SAT standard deviation are all statistically
insignificant. Further, their inclusion does not meaningfully alter our estimates of peer
effects from average SAT scores.
Columns 3 and 6 take a non-linear in means approach, as used in Carrell et al.
(2013). Here the peer effect variable is the fraction of a student’s potential peers in the top
and bottom SAT score quartiles of her graduating class. Findings echo our basic results on
the negative effects from higher peer ability. Degrees of statistical significance vary, but in
all cases, a larger fraction of high-ability peers harms academic performance, while a larger
fraction of low-ability peers benefits it.
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Though modest in size, our estimates of negative peer effects at the company level
seem unshakable, while the positive effects discussed in other studies appear fragile to al-
ternative specifications. Many other studies fail to estimate statistically significant effects,
perhaps because they use far fewer grade observations. Aside from Carrell et al. (2009)’s
result for peers’ verbal SAT scores, they find that peers’ math SAT scores are statistically
insignificant with respect to a freshman’s GPA. Lyle (2007) also finds no effect from peers’
math SAT scores (he does not report results for verbal scores). Nor does Zimmerman (2003)
find a statistically significant effect for peers’ math SAT in his primary estimation, though
the estimated effect does have a negative sign.
On the other hand, our reduced form estimates are evocative of the negative out-
comes of the peer group experiment at USAFA implemented and discussed by Carrel et al.
(2013). As described earlier, Carrell et al. (2013) suggest negative effects from grouping
lower ability students with a large number of high-ability students stem from homophily
considerations (in the peer group measured at the squadron level). Our company level
results are consistent with this idea. Students may self-select in particular ways within
companies and this behavior manifests in negative spillovers. Here we can argue that in a
context where students are assigned into some broad peer group and may interact in many
different academic and non-academic settings, any positive peer effects that might occur
via studying are overwhelmed by the tendency towards homophily. We discuss further the
possible mechanisms at work in Section 5.4 below. First, however, we consider a setting
for peer effects where students are more likely to interact, performing specific and common
tasks.
5.2 Coursemate Subgroup Model
To explore further the intuition of peer group formation, we estimate possible peer effects at
the companymate-coursemate level.20 We stratify by both course type (humanities/social
science, math/science) and peer group size (2-10, 11-30, 31 or more), where freshman i’s
peer group—and there is potentially a different peer group for each of i’s distinct grades—is
defined by the set of freshmen companymates contemporaneously taking the same course.
Table 4 contains OLS estimates of equation (8). Standard errors are clustered by academic
year-company groups.
Across all models, estimates of the control variables’ coefficients are consistent with
previous findings. Striking differences appear, however, when comparing the companymate-
coursemate-specific peer effects across different peer group sizes. For small peer group sizes
(2-10), the results of which are shown in columns 1 and 4, we observe positive peer effects in
20We can also try to estimate peer effects simply at the coursemate level. This however produces difficulties
in identification, mainly due to the large size of these groups. Average SAT scores for these large groups tend
not to vary enough across courses (recall that all freshmen select essentially the same schedule of courses).
These results, although they are uninteresting, are available upon request.
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hum/ss courses when those peers have stronger verbal SAT scores, and we observe positive
peer effects in math/sci courses when those peers have stronger math SAT scores. These
estimates are significant at the 0.1 percent level but appear smaller than estimates in previ-
ous literature: A one standard deviation (11.7 point) increase in coursemate-companymates’
average SAT verbal score yields, on average, a 0.013 point higher hum/ss course grade, and
a one standard deviation (10.0 point) increase in coursemate-companymates’ average SAT
math score yields, on average, a 0.0074 point higher math/sci course grades. Carrell et al.
(2009), for example, find that a one standard deviation increase in peers’ average verbal SAT
results in 0.05 additional grade points. Here it appears that the ability of peers who both
take the same course and live in the same company positively influence academic outcomes.
As the cohort of companymates increases in size within a course, however, the
positive peer effects disappear. There is modest evidence of a negative peer effect through
math SAT for groups of size 11-30 in math/sci courses. For peer groups greater than
thirty, the group compositions approach the full company of freshman students. This simply
captures those who are all taking the basic core courses that most freshmen are required to
take. Results are consistent with our framework discussed in Section 2. Smaller peer groups
working on a narrow range of course-specific tasks are far more likely to interact with each
other and influence one another’s performance (in the conceptual framework this would be
represented by a smaller φ). As the scope of social interaction becomes more narrow and
task-oriented, differences in innate characteristics play a smaller role in causing negative
homophily effects.
A possible criticism is that, since we argue that both types of peer groups—broad
company and narrower course-company—influence grades, the course-companymate sub-
group model might suffer omitted variable bias since it excludes company-wide peer effect
controls. If we include both peer effect channels and observe that signs and magnitudes
of coefficients do not change, then there is no such bias. Therefore it is instructive to es-
timate a “horse-race” model that contains peer effect variables at both full company and
course-company levels, but still stratified by coursemate-companymate peer group size. Es-
timation of this model essentially produces the results of table 4, now adding the peer effect
controls from columns 1 and 4 of table 3. We do not report these results here (available
upon request), but they affirm the findings of both tables 3 and 4. Horse-race models pre-
serve negative company-wide peer effects and positive coursemate-companymate effects in
the small subgroups (both types of peer effects coefficients are statistically significant in
these models).
5.3 Robustness Checks
We further explore these positive peer effects from coursemate-companymate groups by
performing a number of alternative empirical exercises.
18
5.3.1 Non-linear Channels of Peer Influence
Here we examine if our findings differ when we use a non-linear specification for peer
influence—the fraction of top and bottom quartile SAT performers in the same course-
company group. Table 5 reports results. Our thesis on positive peer effects for small course-
company groups is supported here. In column 1, a greater share of “high-verbal” peers, as
proxied by a greater share of high verbal SAT performers, helps individual performance in
hum/ss courses, while a greater share of “low-verbal” peers hurts individual performance.
And we see that “low-math” peers on net further pull down grades for hum/ss classes.
For math/sci courses, we see that low-math ability peers in particular hurt individ-
ual performance. The estimated coefficient on high-math ability peers is positive but not
statistically significant.
We also see that these results reverse as peer group size increases. For larger peer
groups, our findings revert back to those in table 2 (columns 3 and 6), suggesting negative
peer effects at the broader company level.
Another non-linear approach is to interact average peer quality with the quantile
ranking of students’ own SAT scores. This would conceivably allow us to observe potential
differences of peer effects for relatively poor students versus relatively strong students (Burke
and Sass, 2013; Lavy et al., 2012). These results however provide us no additional insights;
students at the low end of the distribution appear similarly affected by peer spillovers as
those at the high end (specific estimations are not reported here but are available upon
request). Thus consistent with our discussion from Section 2, peer effects appear similar
across student ability levels.
5.3.2 Are Results Driven Merely by Subgroup Size?
Here check if this positive effect is simply an artifact of picking smaller subgroups within
the larger company. We redo the exercise of table 4, now using a placebo peer group:
for each grade Gigct, we define freshman i’s peer group as his or her company g mates
who are not taking course c. We stratify grades, as always, by humanities/social science
courses and math/science courses. Table 6 displays results. For proper comparison, we
also reproduce the same peer subgroup stratifications as in the main results of table 4. For
example, columns 2 and 6 use observations of Gigct only when student i had between two
and ten companymates in course c, even though the peer effect itself is calculated from
companymates not in course c.
Here we observe that all peer effects are either negative or not statistically different
from zero. These falsification tests suggest that academic interaction is a key factor in
generating positive peer spillovers, not merely peer group size.
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5.3.3 Is There Something Special About Small Course-Company Subgroups?
To answer this question table 7 provides more summary statistics over grade observations,
broken down into the three standard subgroup sizes (2-10, 11-30, 31 or more) and the two
standard course types (hum/ss, math/sci). These different groups look quite similar in
terms of both demographics and academic backgrounds. This is further echoed in figure
4. We can see that the distributions of ability, as proxied by SAT scores, are very similar
across different peer groups.
Perhaps these course-company group sizes correlate with average grades in the
course. A potential concern is that structural differences in courses produces the differ-
ences in peer effects across group sizes seen in table 4. For example, grades assigned when
coursemate-companymate peer groups are only of size 2-10 may more frequently come from
courses with lower enrollment. If it were the case that, only in such courses, instructors
tend to assign higher grades overall—specifically when there are more high ability students
present—then our positive estimates of γs would be biased upward by course size-related
grade inflation. Due to a lack of variation within small companymate-coursemate subgroups,
including a full set of company-course fixed effects (Yct) is not possible in the model shown
in equation (8).
Table 8 addresses this by controlling for the average grade given in that course
the previous year (a proxy for Yct).
21 Conceptually this may be an important control.
Estimates show, however, that our positive peer effects for small peer group sizes hold up
with the additional control. Freshman-year courses associated with smaller peer groups do
not appear to distribute higher or lower grades in any systematic way. We also see a fair
amount of grade persistence over time—the average grade of a course in prior years is a
strong predictor of one’s own grade in that course. But the addition of this control keeps
our overall findings on peer effects at the company-course level intact.
5.3.4 Is There Selection Into Course-Company Subgroups?
As mentioned previously, freshman have little to no discretion over their first semester
course content. There is a standard mix of classes nearly all freshman must complete. But
in a college where there is such focus on standard course content for freshmen, how do we
observe so many cases of small coursemate-companymate groups, and what determines their
selection?
There are indeed many cases where incoming freshmen take courses for which there
are only a few other freshmen in the same company who are also enrolled. There are
essentially four possibilities: (1) they are deemed to have insufficient background knowledge
21Technically, the variable “Avg. course grade (previous year)” is the residual from a regression of the
one-year lag of the course’s average grade on the peer group average SAT scores of students enrolled in
the course. We include this measure to capture those factors other than student ability that may influence
faculty to give higher or lower course grades from the school average.
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and must take remedial courses; (2) they have validated core courses and so are allowed
to take advanced courses; (3) they are taking specialized courses based on background or
interest (such as a “critical” language such as Chinese or Arabic); (4) they are taking a
standard core course that, for some random reason, many others in their company will take
in a later semester. In any of these circumstances, students still has no control over who
they are in the course with (companymates or otherwise) or their instructor (see Section 3.3
for discussion of this point).
Still, one might question whether selection on common attributes might be driving
positive peer effects in some way. That is, perhaps selection into small courses is based
on some individual-level characteristics (unobservable to us) that also influence grades. To
test this idea we re-estimate the coursemate-companymate specification, but now we only
include instances of the fourth case mentioned above. That is, we entirely exclude non-core
and potentially specialized courses from the analysis.
Results are presented in table 9. Despite the dramatically lower number of observa-
tions, we still observe a positive and statistically significant peer effect within small groups
via high-verbal ability peers in hum/ss courses. We also see a positive coefficient for small
groups with high math-ability peers for math/sci courses, although it is not statistically
significant (recall that in table 4, the SAT math-related positive peer effect was smaller, and
here the number of observations are almost one fourth of those used in table 4). On the
other hand, all estimated coefficients for peer groups larger than ten have negative signs.
We consider an additional robustness check for potentially problematic course se-
lection. We perform regression tests for course random assignment that are similar to those
presented at the company level in table 2. That is, for each course in each academic year
that contained at least 60 freshmen,22 we regress own SAT math score on coursemate-
companymates’ average SAT math score, conditional on pre-USNA characteristics (and we
repeat for SAT verbal scores). There are 305 such courses in our sample, so we perform a
total of 610 distinct regressions, collecting the p-values of the peer effect variables’ coeffi-
cients from each. Uniformly distributed p-values would provide evidence against problematic
course selection. Figure 5 shows distributions of p-values from SAT math and SAT verbal
regressions separately. Using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, we cannot reject uniformity of
p-values from the SAT verbal regressions (p = 0.382) but we reject it for p-values from the
SAT math regressions (p = 0.045).
Since the course-by-course regressions may indicate problematic selection on SAT
math scores, we carry out one more robustness check. In table 10, we re-estimate the
main coursemate-companymate peer effects model—equation (8)—now including observa-
tions only from the courses that generated p-values over 0.10 for both the SAT math and
verbal regressions above (i.e., courses for which there is no strong evidence of selection).
22The analysis is not sensitive to this cutoff; a cutoff of 60 provides an average of at least two freshmen
from each company in each course.
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While sample sizes are now lower, the previously-seen pattern of peer effects persists. There
is a positive and statistically significant peer effect within small groups via high-verbal abil-
ity peers in hum/ss courses. There is also a positive coefficient for small groups with high
math-ability peers for math/sci courses. All coefficient estimates for peer groups larger than
ten have negative signs or are statistically significant.
These results suggest that our positive peer effects are not merely driven by selection
on similar characteristics into small courses. Again, relationships based on narrowly defined
tasks can generate positive peer influence. In these situations, homophily may simply not
matter as much.
5.4 Discussion
The simple model in Section 2 posits a mechanism to explain the opposing findings from
company and company-course levels. It must be the case that at some point the costs of
mingling with the high-ability persons simply outweighs the benefits and this calculus is
different depending on the peer group’s scope. With respect to various explanations of peer
effects, our results and our simple model evoke the idea of “invidious comparison” discussed
in Hoxby and Weingarth (2005).23 In such a scenario, the low achieving student is put off
by the presence of high ability individuals, since it lowers her own status in the peer group
and affects the student’s self-esteem (and hence her performance). The idea of invidious
comparison is captured in the model in Section 2 since the presence of high ability types
affects the decision on how many peers to interact with—driven by the trade-off between
group identification versus academic achievement—which ultimately affects performance.
The model in Section 2 also helps explain the results from Carrell et al. (2013)
where the bimodal treatment group leads to a sort of self-segregation. The low-ability
students cluster together while the high-ability students do the same. A post-experiment
survey indicates that low-ability students are more likely to study with low-ability peer
group members (more so than low ability students in the control peer group). The authors
speculate that there may be a threshold, where once the fraction of low-ability members
of the group reaches some point, then the endogenous sorting with like-ability individuals
becomes more prevalent.
Moreover, one could imagine the idea of invidious comparison to be particularly
strong for college freshmen, relative to their high school experiences. The typical high
school senior who might attend USNA is a “big fish in a small pond,” confident in her
standing in the high school’s distribution of ability. Once at college, however, that same
23This idea also hints at the tension between popularity and academic achievement among high school
students highlighted in Fryer and Torelli (2010). In the Fryer and Torelli (2010) explanation there is a
disincentive to accumulate human capital out of uncertainly of labor market outcomes, which may make
more sense from the perspective of a high school student. That is probably less applicable for students
already in college, whom arguably have made the decision to enroll in college out of some understanding of
labor market payoffs relative to not attending college.
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student is the proverbial small fish in a big pond and the tendency towards homophily
over achievement becomes more natural. Now at college, the freshman, perhaps still quite
immature, is overwhelmed by the caliber of her peers. Under this scenario, the penchant for
homophily may dominate, as the overwhelmed student seeks refuge in students with similar
ability. Yet, at the company-course level, such mechanisms are less likely.
At the company-course level, the peer group is fundamentally different, both in
size and purpose. Here, the mechanisms driving the positive effects are possibly explained
by the “boutique” model of peer effects (as reviewed by Hoxby and Weingarth (2005)).
In this case homogeneity of ability benefits performance perhaps due to the opportunity
for the teacher or school to tailor instruction to the common ability level.24 In the USNA
setting, the freshman courses include common curricula and exams, and the section sizes are
small. Engaged together on common tasks in small groups, the environment for invidious
comparison as inspiration for homophily is mitigated. The fact that positive effects disappear
as the group size grows (and increasingly resembles the company) supports this story.
Another explanation is that at the company-course level the positive endogenous
effects from interaction—studying and working together—outweigh any possible negative
contextual effect. Indeed, this discussion is speculative but is supported by both our con-
ceptual model and our reduced form results as they relate to the structural model. As noted
in Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) peer effects are likely non-linear, so the typical linear-in-
means estimation restricts its measurement. So our linear results may ultimately mask the
true effects, as is the case with all attempts using linear-in-means models. However, the
contrasting results for our different peer group levels, and the different effects found for
each, provide insight into what may be occurring within the black box of peer interaction.
6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent findings of positive peer effect
spillovers in some contexts and seemingly negative spillovers in other contexts. In short, our
paper highlights the idea that context matters. In large social settings or living arrange-
ments, more favorable average peer attributes can perversely lower individual performance
as individuals increasingly group with those of like-traits. In other settings where individ-
uals are engaged in common work on tasks, such grouping patterns can be overcome. Our
results can guide policy interventions meant to harness peer effects. Cognizance about po-
tential complications of peer group assignment is critical. Increasing peer quality can foster
beneficial collaboration in common tasks in close-knit, small peer groups, but the specific
24Related to the boutique model is the “focus” model which takes boutique idea a bit further. In the focus
model the positive effects from a relatively homogenous peer group may even spill over to the few students
somewhat differentiated from the typical member of the group. And as the number of atypical students
increases and the ability level becomes bimodal or multimodal the alleged benefits of the homogeneity will
decrease.
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design of “optimal peer groups” for positive educational outcomes is indeed complicated
and remains an avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Grade Effects from Changes in Average Peer Ability with High “Distaste” for
Peer Differences
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Note: Blue solid lines depict the individual’s grade performance as the average ability of
the potential peer group rises uniformly.
26
Figure 2: Grade Effects from Changes in Average Peer Ability with Low “Distaste” for Peer
Differences
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Note: Blue solid lines depict the individual’s grade performance as the average ability of
the potential peer group rises uniformly.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Companymate-Coursemate Peer Groups
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Note: Shows the distribution of companymate-coursemate peer group sizes, divided into
humanities/social science courses and math/science courses. Distributions naturally yield
the peer group size divisions used in the regression analysis: 2-10, 11-30, 31 or more.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Math SAT Score for Companymate-Coursemate Peer Groups
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Note: Shows the distribution of math SAT score for each bin of companymate-coursemate
peer group size, divided into humanities/social science courses and math/science courses
(we do not present similar distributions for verbal SAT score).
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Figure 5: Distributions of p-values from Course-by-course Regressions (checking random
assignment)
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Note: For each course containing 60 or more freshman, we estimate two distinct regressions:
(1) own SAT math regressed on coursemate-companymates’ average SAT math; (2) own SAT
verbal regressed on coursemate-companymates’ average SAT verbal. All regressions also
control for gender, race/ethnicity, prior enlisted status, and feeder source. Histograms show
the distributions of p-values for each coefficient of the peer effect variable (i.e., coursemate-
companymates’ average SAT), across all eligible courses.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean* Std.Dev.
Female 0.15 0.36
Race/ethnicity:
Black 0.06 0.24
Asian 0.04 0.20
Hispanic 0.08 0.27
White 0.79 0.41
Other 0.02 0.15
Recruited athlete 0.27 0.44
Prior enlisted 0.09 0.29
Feeder source:
NAPS 0.17 0.38
Foundation school 0.07 0.25
None 0.75 0.43
Other 0.02 0.13
Own SAT math 662 64.3
Own SAT verbal 639 68.8
Companymates’ SAT math 662 9.9
Companymates’ SAT verbal 638 12.0
Course-companymates’ SAT math 661 31.3
Course-companymates’ SAT verbal 638 32.0
Observations 100,593
Note: *Column shows sample means for SAT scores and sample proportions for all other
variables.
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Table 2: Regression Checks for Company Random Assignment
Dep. Var.: Own SAT Math Own SAT Verbal
Indep. Var.: Peers’ SAT Math (average) Peers’ SAT Verbal (average)
Ac. Year: Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Obs.
1988 0.0546 (0.186) 0.144 (0.164) 1176
1989 -0.306 (0.329) -0.140 (0.232) 1198
1990 -0.369 (0.246) -0.215 (0.297) 1234
1991 -0.820** (0.280) 0.0597 (0.185) 1101
1992 -0.667 (0.404) -0.232 (0.260) 1030
1993 -0.114 (0.233) -0.270 (0.246) 1121
1994 -0.614 (0.345) -0.215 (0.282) 1064
1995 -0.275 (0.253) 0.0524 (0.211) 989
1996 -0.300 (0.417) -0.328 (0.225) 1015
1997 -0.744 (0.455) -0.765 (0.395) 1031
1998 -0.233 (0.254) -0.148 (0.241) 1040
1999 -0.830* (0.381) -0.489 (0.602) 1113
2000 -0.0493 (0.294) -0.548 (0.372) 1105
2001 -0.0471 (0.292) -1.169 (0.615) 1117
2002 -0.222 (0.293) -0.399 (0.392) 1146
2003 -0.259 (0.257) -0.0614 (0.242) 1127
2004 -0.770 (0.453) -0.113 (0.312) 1155
2005 -0.874 (0.453) 0.251 (0.187) 1165
2006 -0.569 (0.395) -0.329 (0.332) 1152
2007 -0.0159 (0.179) 0.0197 (0.242) 1167
2008 -0.240 (0.277) 0.102 (0.179) 1128
2009 -0.248 (0.209) -0.00832 (0.240) 1188
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001. This table presents point estimates and standard
errors of one particular coefficient in 44 distinct regressions. OLS estimations are carried out
separately for subsamples of freshmen from each graduating class. The dependent variable
is either own SAT math or own SAT verbal and the independent variable of interest is
either companymates’ average SAT math or companymates’ average SAT verbal. Each
specification also controls for gender, race/ethnicity, prior enlisted status, and feeder source.
Standard errors are clustered by company.
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Table 3: Regressions - All Freshman Companymates as Peers
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science Courses Math and Science Courses
Female 0.0430*** 0.0430*** 0.0433*** -0.0896*** -0.0897*** -0.0893***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.278*** -0.267*** -0.267*** -0.267***
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213)
Asian -0.0896*** -0.0896*** -0.0895*** -0.0802*** -0.0801*** -0.0792***
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0236)
Hispanic -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.200***
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191)
Recruited athlete -0.0822*** -0.0821*** -0.0822*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132***
(0.00932) (0.00933) (0.00933) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Prior enlisted 0.00877 0.00908 0.00887 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.157***
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.162*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141***
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Foundation school -0.0594*** -0.0590*** -0.0590*** -0.0821*** -0.0814*** -0.0814***
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0208)
Other -0.0271 -0.0273 -0.0269 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.248***
(0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416)
Own SAT math 0.000550*** 0.000547*** 0.000549*** 0.00513*** 0.00513*** 0.00513***
(0.0000770) (0.0000771) (0.0000770) (0.000101) (0.000101) (0.000101)
Own SAT verbal 0.00297*** 0.00297*** 0.00297*** 0.000307*** 0.000308*** 0.000307***
(0.0000726) (0.0000726) (0.0000727) (0.0000834) (0.0000835) (0.0000836)
Peers’ SAT math (avg.) -0.000945 -0.000978 -0.00198** -0.00199**
(0.000547) (0.000547) (0.000710) (0.000706)
Peers’ SAT math (std. dev.) -0.000709 -0.00141
(0.000590) (0.000870)
Fraction of peers in top SAT math quartile -0.143* -0.228**
(0.0676) (0.0879)
Fraction of peers in bottom SAT math quartile 0.0882 0.152
(0.0612) (0.0831)
Peers’ SAT verbal (avg.) -0.000785 -0.000823* -0.00161** -0.00165**
(0.000408) (0.000406) (0.000562) (0.000562)
Peers’ SAT verbal (std. dev.) -0.000290 0.000320
(0.000498) (0.000656)
Fraction of peers in top SAT verbal quartile -0.0729 -0.0667
(0.0561) (0.0778)
Fraction of peers in bottom SAT verbal quartile 0.0147 0.220**
(0.0592) (0.0743)
Constant 1.619*** 1.726*** 0.514*** 1.150* 1.245* -1.235***
(0.405) (0.406) (0.0662) (0.500) (0.503) (0.0827)
Observations 47748 47748 47748 52845 52845 52845
R2 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.146 0.146 0.146
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for
humanities and social science course grades (columns 1-3) and math and science course
grades (column 4-6). Models differ in the specifications of peer effect variables. Coefficients
for academic year dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups.
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Table 4: Regressions - Freshman Coursemate-Companymates as Peers
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science Courses Math and Science Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Female 0.139*** 0.106*** -0.0512** -0.0238 -0.144*** -0.0993***
(0.0238) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0192) (0.0230) (0.0205)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.225*** -0.253*** -0.326*** -0.217*** -0.334*** -0.268***
(0.0367) (0.0261) (0.0252) (0.0313) (0.0292) (0.0329)
Asian -0.0483 -0.0848** -0.118*** -0.0185 -0.128*** -0.102**
(0.0462) (0.0269) (0.0293) (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0383)
Hispanic -0.0728* -0.120*** -0.182*** -0.173*** -0.214*** -0.211***
(0.0352) (0.0214) (0.0223) (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0283)
Recruited athlete -0.108*** -0.0655*** -0.0920*** -0.0760*** -0.154*** -0.185***
(0.0204) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0183)
Prior enlisted 0.0446 0.000958 0.00419 0.143*** 0.180*** 0.120**
(0.0379) (0.0220) (0.0276) (0.0313) (0.0274) (0.0377)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.119*** -0.158*** -0.191*** 0.0404 0.135*** 0.271***
(0.0302) (0.0174) (0.0194) (0.0256) (0.0227) (0.0257)
Foundation school -0.0785* -0.0546* -0.0509* -0.126*** -0.101*** 0.0246
(0.0392) (0.0211) (0.0222) (0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0314)
Other -0.0352 -0.0148 -0.0221 0.272*** 0.127* 0.395***
(0.0899) (0.0565) (0.0520) (0.0646) (0.0638) (0.0601)
Own SAT math 0.000699*** 0.000387*** 0.000599*** 0.00399*** 0.00508*** 0.00616***
(0.000181) (0.000108) (0.000110) (0.000149) (0.000169) (0.000146)
Own SAT verbal 0.00252*** 0.00286*** 0.00285*** -0.000325** 0.000389** 0.000952***
(0.000166) (0.000108) (0.000103) (0.000118) (0.000129) (0.000126)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT math (avg.) 0.0000572 -0.00118 -0.000179 0.000738*** -0.00246*** -0.000542
(0.000213) (0.000624) (0.000768) (0.000183) (0.000563) (0.000915)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT verbal (avg.) 0.00109*** -0.000646 -0.000795 0.000147 -0.000894 -0.00179*
(0.000180) (0.000503) (0.000629) (0.000194) (0.000612) (0.000797)
Constant -0.0483 1.821*** 1.197* -0.665*** 1.017** -0.922
(0.153) (0.430) (0.560) (0.131) (0.375) (0.692)
Observations 6342 19896 21510 19842 19197 13806
R2 0.292 0.138 0.166 0.148 0.144 0.215
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for
humanities and social science course grades (columns 1-3) and math and science course
grades (columns 4-6). Estimations are further stratified by the size of the coursemate-peer
group associated with each grade observation (sizes 2-10, 11-30, and over 30). Coefficients
for academic year dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups.
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Table 5: Robustness - Freshman Coursemate-Companymates as Peers (Alternate Peer Effect
Specification)
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science Courses Math and Science Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Female 0.138*** 0.107*** -0.0509** -0.0241 -0.143*** -0.0993***
(0.0237) (0.0163) (0.0175) (0.0191) (0.0230) (0.0205)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.222*** -0.253*** -0.326*** -0.213*** -0.335*** -0.268***
(0.0367) (0.0260) (0.0252) (0.0314) (0.0292) (0.0329)
Asian -0.0483 -0.0855** -0.118*** -0.0179 -0.128*** -0.102**
(0.0461) (0.0269) (0.0293) (0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0383)
Hispanic -0.0708* -0.120*** -0.181*** -0.173*** -0.214*** -0.212***
(0.0352) (0.0214) (0.0222) (0.0285) (0.0276) (0.0283)
Recruited athlete -0.108*** -0.0653*** -0.0921*** -0.0748*** -0.155*** -0.185***
(0.0204) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0183)
Prior enlisted 0.0508 0.000858 0.00421 0.145*** 0.178*** 0.119**
(0.0377) (0.0219) (0.0276) (0.0314) (0.0274) (0.0377)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.117*** -0.159*** -0.191*** 0.0409 0.135*** 0.270***
(0.0301) (0.0174) (0.0195) (0.0256) (0.0227) (0.0257)
Foundation school -0.0773* -0.0543* -0.0502* -0.126*** -0.0998*** 0.0239
(0.0390) (0.0211) (0.0223) (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0315)
Other -0.0323 -0.0144 -0.0225 0.268*** 0.127* 0.396***
(0.0906) (0.0564) (0.0520) (0.0646) (0.0635) (0.0600)
Own SAT math 0.000717*** 0.000385*** 0.000596*** 0.00399*** 0.00508*** 0.00616***
(0.000180) (0.000108) (0.000110) (0.000150) (0.000169) (0.000145)
Own SAT verbal 0.00250*** 0.00286*** 0.00285*** -0.000320** 0.000389** 0.000950***
(0.000169) (0.000108) (0.000103) (0.000118) (0.000129) (0.000126)
Fraction of peers in top SAT math quartile -0.0667* -0.169* -0.117 0.00361 -0.316*** 0.0855
(0.0294) (0.0851) (0.0932) (0.0279) (0.0912) (0.154)
Fraction of peers in bottom SAT math quartile -0.111*** 0.0908 0.0194 -0.119*** 0.172* 0.0994
(0.0316) (0.0792) (0.0901) (0.0335) (0.0776) (0.131)
Fraction of peers in top SAT verbal quartile 0.120*** -0.196** -0.0341 0.0102 -0.0455 -0.296*
(0.0298) (0.0693) (0.0923) (0.0289) (0.0815) (0.134)
Fraction of peers in bottom SAT verbal quartile -0.102** -0.0738 0.0255 -0.0461 0.0833 0.0410
(0.0360) (0.0675) (0.0858) (0.0326) (0.0863) (0.124)
Constant 0.732*** 0.719*** 0.598*** -0.0412 -1.165*** -2.411***
(0.142) (0.0979) (0.102) (0.115) (0.137) (0.166)
Observations 6342 19896 21510 19842 19197 13806
R2 0.294 0.139 0.166 0.148 0.145 0.215
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for
humanities and social science course grades (columns 1-3) and math and science course
grades (columns 4-6). Estimations are further stratified by the size of the coursemate-peer
group associated with each grade observation (sizes 2-10, 11-30, and over 30). Coefficients
for academic year dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups.
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Table 6: Robustness - Freshman Companymates Not in Same Course as Peers
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science Courses Math and Science Courses
Peer group size: All 2-10 11-30 31 or more All 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Female 0.0601*** -0.0866*** 0.153*** 0.124*** -0.0383* -0.0234 -0.144*** -0.0908***
(0.0116) (0.0144) (0.0239) (0.0168) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0232) (0.0207)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.271*** -0.270*** -0.223*** -0.253*** -0.316*** -0.214*** -0.341*** -0.271***
(0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0369) (0.0272) (0.0274) (0.0313) (0.0294) (0.0336)
Asian -0.0811*** -0.0765** -0.0448 -0.0903*** -0.0971** -0.0174 -0.119*** -0.102**
(0.0202) (0.0234) (0.0462) (0.0270) (0.0319) (0.0341) (0.0337) (0.0393)
Hispanic -0.139*** -0.202*** -0.0761* -0.125*** -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.212*** -0.222***
(0.0158) (0.0192) (0.0356) (0.0218) (0.0233) (0.0286) (0.0278) (0.0290)
Recruited athlete -0.0810*** -0.130*** -0.113*** -0.0698*** -0.0856*** -0.0779*** -0.152*** -0.184***
(0.00956) (0.0119) (0.0204) (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0181) (0.0168) (0.0188)
Prior enlisted 0.0108 0.160*** 0.0517 0.00310 0.00692 0.145*** 0.180*** 0.120**
(0.0176) (0.0209) (0.0377) (0.0224) (0.0297) (0.0314) (0.0281) (0.0374)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.165*** 0.133*** -0.120*** -0.160*** -0.201*** 0.0500 0.129*** 0.267***
(0.0131) (0.0161) (0.0303) (0.0177) (0.0202) (0.0256) (0.0231) (0.0264)
Foundation school -0.0538** -0.0889*** -0.0815* -0.0609** -0.0293 -0.124*** -0.109*** 0.0193
(0.0163) (0.0209) (0.0397) (0.0218) (0.0240) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0319)
Other -0.0196 0.251*** -0.0606 0.00685 -0.0258 0.276*** 0.124 0.411***
(0.0412) (0.0420) (0.0901) (0.0552) (0.0584) (0.0646) (0.0650) (0.0617)
Own SAT math 0.000553*** 0.00498*** 0.000707*** 0.000395*** 0.000586*** 0.00417*** 0.00487*** 0.00613***
(0.0000793) (0.000102) (0.000182) (0.000108) (0.000118) (0.000141) (0.000170) (0.000147)
Own SAT verbal 0.00290*** 0.000255** 0.00299*** 0.00275*** 0.00276*** -0.000305* 0.000350** 0.000908***
(0.0000739) (0.0000843) (0.000158) (0.000109) (0.000109) (0.000119) (0.000130) (0.000128)
Non-coursemate-peers’ SAT math (avg.) 0.0000947 -0.00183*** -0.00198* 0.000320 0.0000107 -0.00246** -0.000256 0.0000367
(0.000128) (0.000258) (0.000942) (0.000223) (0.000132) (0.000756) (0.000407) (0.000213)
Non-coursemate-peers’ SAT verbal (avg.) -0.000328*** -0.000528* -0.00205* -0.000526*** -0.000169 -0.00111 -0.000258 -0.0000286
(0.0000889) (0.000248) (0.000888) (0.000146) (0.0000982) (0.000689) (0.000313) (0.000214)
Constant 0.692*** 0.473** 3.043*** 0.842*** 0.750*** 2.136*** -0.688* -2.411***
(0.0969) (0.177) (0.739) (0.162) (0.125) (0.554) (0.285) (0.203)
Observations 43338 51932 6342 18524 18472 19842 18911 13179
R2 0.167 0.149 0.286 0.135 0.162 0.148 0.140 0.213
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for all humanities and social science course grades
and all math and science course grades, as well as across coursemate-companymate peer subgroups. Coefficients for academic year
dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown. Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics - By Coursemate-Companymate Subgroup Sizes
Humanities and Social Science Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Mean* Std. Dev. Mean* Std. Dev. Mean* Std. Dev.
Female 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37
Race/ethnicity:
Black 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Asian 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
White 0.76 0.43 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41
Other 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16
Recruited athlete 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Prior enlisted 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28
Feeder source:
NAPS 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38
Foundation school 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25
None 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.43 0.74 0.44
Other 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.13
Own SAT math 667 72.1 660 61.9 662 64.9
Own SAT verbal 650 89.5 637 61.6 637 66.6
Observations 6,342 19,896 21,510
Math and Science Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Mean* Std. Dev. Mean* Std. Dev. Mean* Std. Dev.
Female 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.38
Race/ethnicity:
Black 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Asian 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Hispanic 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
White 0.80 0.40 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42
Other 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18
Recruited athlete 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Prior enlisted 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27
Feeder source:
NAPS 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
Foundation school 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
None 0.76 0.43 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.44
Other 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14
Own SAT math 669 68.7 655 56.6 659 65.2
Own SAT verbal 643 70.8 636 66.5 636 70.4
Observations 19,842 19,197 13,806
Note: *Column shows sample means for SAT scores and sample proportions for all other
variables.
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Table 8: Robustness - Freshman Coursemate-Companymates as Peers (with Average Course
Grade Control)
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science Courses Math and Science Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Female 0.108*** 0.115*** -0.0480** -0.0202 -0.147*** -0.100***
(0.0240) (0.0163) (0.0177) (0.0194) (0.0239) (0.0205)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.211*** -0.255*** -0.331*** -0.207*** -0.334*** -0.269***
(0.0375) (0.0265) (0.0259) (0.0322) (0.0301) (0.0330)
Asian -0.0548 -0.0837** -0.106*** -0.0209 -0.136*** -0.100**
(0.0465) (0.0268) (0.0298) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0383)
Hispanic -0.0574 -0.123*** -0.176*** -0.168*** -0.226*** -0.212***
(0.0341) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0293) (0.0287) (0.0283)
Recruited athlete -0.0881*** -0.0679*** -0.0927*** -0.0569** -0.153*** -0.187***
(0.0203) (0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0181) (0.0171) (0.0183)
Prior enlisted 0.0441 -0.00321 -0.00167 0.137*** 0.176*** 0.116**
(0.0376) (0.0221) (0.0285) (0.0327) (0.0281) (0.0376)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.102*** -0.156*** -0.199*** 0.0482 0.120*** 0.267***
(0.0302) (0.0177) (0.0197) (0.0265) (0.0231) (0.0257)
Foundation school -0.0814* -0.0573** -0.0517* -0.120*** -0.0930** 0.0224
(0.0386) (0.0214) (0.0228) (0.0305) (0.0302) (0.0314)
Other 0.00276 0.0115 -0.00861 0.233*** 0.134* 0.401***
(0.0932) (0.0548) (0.0542) (0.0698) (0.0667) (0.0600)
Own SAT math 0.000694*** 0.000394*** 0.000602*** 0.00339*** 0.00486*** 0.00609***
(0.000179) (0.000109) (0.000113) (0.000160) (0.000169) (0.000145)
Own SAT verbal 0.00203*** 0.00284*** 0.00280*** -0.000322** 0.000389** 0.000937***
(0.000174) (0.000107) (0.000104) (0.000122) (0.000134) (0.000125)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT math (avg.) 0.000137 -0.00132* -0.0000744 0.00128*** -0.00222*** -0.000569
(0.000208) (0.000598) (0.000749) (0.000189) (0.000553) (0.000912)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT verbal (avg.) 0.00150*** -0.000697 -0.000910 0.000116 -0.00101 -0.00181*
(0.000178) (0.000497) (0.000610) (0.000199) (0.000593) (0.000796)
Avg. course grade (previous year) 0.390*** 0.563*** 0.479*** 0.533*** 0.767*** 1.686***
(0.0407) (0.0796) (0.0785) (0.0273) (0.0364) (0.170)
Constant -0.0426 1.958*** 1.232* -0.612*** 1.075** -0.840
(0.152) (0.417) (0.548) (0.133) (0.378) (0.689)
Observations 6032 19434 20863 18389 17857 13775
R2 0.312 0.139 0.166 0.169 0.160 0.218
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for
humanities and social science course grades (columns 1-3) and math and science course
grades (columns 4-6). Estimations are further stratified by the size of the coursemate-peer
group associated with each grade observation (sizes 2-10, 11-30, and over 30). Coefficients
for academic year dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups. Average course grade
from the previous year was dropped in the far-right column due to high collinearity with
academic year dummies in that subsample.
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Table 9: Robustness - Freshman Coursemate-Companymates as Peers (only Core Course
Grades)
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science Core Courses Math and Science Core Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Female 0.153*** 0.111*** -0.0528** -0.0433 -0.140*** -0.0992***
(0.0358) (0.0163) (0.0181) (0.0340) (0.0240) (0.0209)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.181** -0.252*** -0.333*** -0.144** -0.314*** -0.259***
(0.0579) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0468) (0.0318) (0.0342)
Asian -0.0555 -0.0886** -0.115*** -0.0881 -0.130*** -0.0959*
(0.0665) (0.0273) (0.0305) (0.0700) (0.0382) (0.0403)
Hispanic -0.110* -0.117*** -0.195*** -0.141** -0.214*** -0.217***
(0.0548) (0.0215) (0.0230) (0.0456) (0.0301) (0.0288)
Recruited athlete -0.126*** -0.0639*** -0.0914*** -0.101** -0.177*** -0.184***
(0.0326) (0.0126) (0.0141) (0.0307) (0.0187) (0.0187)
Prior enlisted 0.0687 0.00460 0.00441 0.263*** 0.198*** 0.138***
(0.0603) (0.0225) (0.0291) (0.0513) (0.0308) (0.0396)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.128** -0.156*** -0.187*** 0.112** 0.133*** 0.278***
(0.0454) (0.0177) (0.0203) (0.0387) (0.0241) (0.0264)
Foundation school -0.0588 -0.0457* -0.0489* -0.0108 -0.120*** 0.0336
(0.0505) (0.0213) (0.0230) (0.0475) (0.0315) (0.0329)
Other 0.134 -0.0140 -0.0142 0.380*** 0.196** 0.375***
(0.124) (0.0562) (0.0537) (0.0944) (0.0627) (0.0630)
Own SAT math 0.000752** 0.000420*** 0.000616*** 0.00491*** 0.00500*** 0.00614***
(0.000253) (0.000107) (0.000115) (0.000307) (0.000175) (0.000150)
Own SAT verbal 0.00271*** 0.00282*** 0.00283*** -0.000665** 0.000461** 0.000926***
(0.000244) (0.000109) (0.000107) (0.000240) (0.000142) (0.000127)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT math (avg.) 0.0000340 -0.00120 -0.000350 0.000667 -0.00217*** -0.000404
(0.000310) (0.000632) (0.000808) (0.000567) (0.000637) (0.000928)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT verbal (avg.) 0.000843** -0.000534 -0.000592 0.000315 -0.000370 -0.00187*
(0.000273) (0.000518) (0.000648) (0.000482) (0.000600) (0.000817)
Constant 0.166 1.766*** 1.190* -1.384*** 0.603 -0.929
(0.243) (0.437) (0.585) (0.389) (0.413) (0.681)
Observations 2864 19130 19933 5502 14357 12847
R2 0.226 0.137 0.166 0.114 0.172 0.214
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for
humanities and social science course grades (columns 1-3) and math and science course
grades (columns 4-6). Estimations are further stratified by the size of the coursemate-peer
group associated with each grade observation (sizes 2-10, 11-30, and over 30). Coefficients
for academic year dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups.
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Table 10: Robustness - Freshman Coursemate-Companymates as Peers (only “verified-
random” courses)
Dependent Variable: Grade Humanities and Social Science “Verified” Courses Math and Science “Verified” Courses
Peer group size: 2-10 11-30 31 or more 2-10 11-30 31 or more
Female 0.166*** 0.110*** -0.0465* -0.0296 -0.141*** -0.104***
(0.0289) (0.0195) (0.0211) (0.0237) (0.0266) (0.0273)
Race/ethnicity (ref.: white and other)
Black -0.185*** -0.267*** -0.321*** -0.237*** -0.334*** -0.316***
(0.0468) (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0368) (0.0341) (0.0417)
Asian -0.0665 -0.0649* -0.104** -0.0291 -0.139*** -0.0892
(0.0618) (0.0308) (0.0349) (0.0391) (0.0372) (0.0474)
Hispanic -0.0884* -0.123*** -0.176*** -0.185*** -0.214*** -0.253***
(0.0415) (0.0262) (0.0270) (0.0331) (0.0313) (0.0392)
Recruited athlete -0.0809** -0.0803*** -0.0863*** -0.0737*** -0.150*** -0.210***
(0.0262) (0.0146) (0.0161) (0.0201) (0.0188) (0.0244)
Prior enlisted -0.000576 0.00268 -0.0202 0.134*** 0.158*** 0.0839
(0.0491) (0.0249) (0.0324) (0.0360) (0.0301) (0.0479)
Feeder source (ref.: none)
NAPS -0.0917* -0.157*** -0.183*** 0.0650* 0.124*** 0.266***
(0.0383) (0.0203) (0.0237) (0.0288) (0.0256) (0.0347)
Foundation school -0.0387 -0.0516* -0.0564* -0.118*** -0.107** 0.00957
(0.0465) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0355) (0.0334) (0.0409)
Other 0.0801 -0.0310 -0.0258 0.310*** 0.108 0.354***
(0.100) (0.0650) (0.0605) (0.0719) (0.0668) (0.0782)
Own SAT math 0.000789*** 0.000382** 0.000664*** 0.00393*** 0.00492*** 0.00630***
(0.000207) (0.000131) (0.000132) (0.000177) (0.000182) (0.000200)
Own SAT verbal 0.00247*** 0.00294*** 0.00293*** -0.000360** 0.000337* 0.000821***
(0.000194) (0.000123) (0.000118) (0.000138) (0.000149) (0.000170)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT math (avg.) -0.000344 -0.00157* 0.000416 0.000774** -0.00121* 0.000397
(0.000271) (0.000736) (0.000887) (0.000246) (0.000577) (0.00129)
Coursemate-peers’ SAT verbal (avg.) 0.00163*** -0.000467 -0.000540 0.000349 -0.00113 -0.000720
(0.000238) (0.000596) (0.000775) (0.000255) (0.000641) (0.00110)
Constant -0.180 1.920*** 0.541 -0.773*** 0.389 -2.281*
(0.191) (0.509) (0.666) (0.162) (0.395) (1.041)
Observations 3862 14304 14873 14092 14763 8022
R2 0.303 0.137 0.171 0.137 0.134 0.209
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001. OLS estimations are carried out separately for
humanities and social science course grades (columns 1-3) and math and science course
grades (columns 4-6). Estimations are further stratified by the size of the coursemate-peer
group associated with each grade observation (sizes 2-10, 11-30, and over 30). Coefficients
for academic year dummy variables are included in the estimations but are not shown.
Standard errors are clustered by company-academic year groups.
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